Volume 13: Low Carbon Cities and Urban Energy Systems: Part II

Game Theory Analysis of Electric Vehicles Adoption in Beijing under License Plate Control policy Lijing Zhu, Jingzhou Wang

Abstract

To mitigate traffic congestion and improve environment condition, license plate control(LPC) policy has been implemented in Beijing since 2011. For instance, almost 100,000 vehicle license plates are distributed in 2019, including 60,000 electric vehicle (EV) license plate and 40,000 gasoline vehicle (GV) license plate. This paper tends to quantify the optimal EV license plate under the LPC policy in Beijing. A two-level Stackelberg game is proposed to model the interaction between vehicle consumers and the government. The equilibrium allocation of EV and its market share are derived from the Stackelberg model. According to the optimal result, the government should adjust the license plate distribution in order to maximize social utility. Once the government plans to enlarge the total quota to meet the excessive demand in the future, more quotas should be allocated to EV to promote EV adoption. Sensitive analysis is conducted to illustrated the impact of certain influential factors such as gasoline price, electricity price, and renting cost, on EV adoption. The result shows that when gasoline price is in a comparatively low level, consumers are more sensitive to the electricity price. Nevertheless, it becomes less significant if gasoline price goes higher. Besides, the impact of car-renting cost variation on EV adoption is studied. To be specific, if the car-renting cost declines from 2377 CNY/month to 1577 CNY/month due to the mature of renting market, the market share of EV will increase by 0.3%.

Keywords Electric Vehicle, License plate control(LPC)policy, Stackelberg game theory, EV market share